Multinational Force – Ukraine

Multinational Force — Ukraine (MNF-U)
Ukraine's government-controlled territory   Regions annexed or occupied by Russia claimed by Ukraine with support of the UNGA
Founders	2025 London Summit participants
Founding leader	Keir Starmer, British prime minister Emmanuel Macron, French president
Foundation	2025 London Summit on Ukraine, Lancaster House
Allegiance	Coalition of the willing
Motives	Strengthening Ukraine three battlespaces defences: on the land, at sea, in the air
Headquarters	FRA GBR CHQ, Kyiv UKR
Status	As of November 2025: not mandated legally
Allies	Contributors: Coalition member forces troops: Albanian Armed Forces Australian Defence Force Belgian Armed Forces Bulgarian Armed Forces Canadian Armed Forces Danish Defence French Armed Forces Bundeswehr Netherlands Armed Forces New Zealand Defence Force Romanian Armed Forces Swedish Armed Forces Turkish Armed Forces Armed Forces of Ukraine British Armed Forces 'No-troops-provider' militaries: Austrian Armed Forces Armed Forces of Croatia Cypriot National Guard Czech Armed Forces Estonian Defence Forces Finnish Defence Forces Hellenic Armed Forces Defence of Iceland Ireland Armed Forces Italian Armed Forces Japan Self-Defense Forces Latvian National Armed Forces Lithuanian Armed Forces Luxembourg Armed Forces Norwegian Armed Forces Polish Armed Forces Portuguese Armed Forces Slovenian Armed Forces Spanish Armed Forces European Commission European Council NATO Partner country, allied mission, commands, and group: US EUMAM UA NSATU SAG-U and JMTG-U
Battles and wars	Russo-Ukrainian war (2022-present) ongoing for 1384 days
Organization	No-standing • Ad hoc
Footnotes

The Multinational Force – Ukraine (MNF-U), is a proposed, non-permanent armed multinational coalition force, politically led by France and the United Kingdom, designed to deploy to Ukraine only following a comprehensive ceasefire agreement in the aftermath of the Russo-Ukrainian war. As a modular combined joint force, the MNF-U would provide deterrence, ceasefire assurance, and post-conflict stabilization. Its tasks would include logistics, training, air policing, and maritime clearance, with personnel operating under nationally contributed contingents and agreed upon rules of engagement.

Subject to a ceasefire, MNF-U would be established in Ukraine with continental European and overseas military contingents as a deterrent against renewed Russian aggression, in what has been described as one of the largest multinational deployments in Europe since the 1990s.

As MNF-U is not a treaty-based entity, pre-deployment membership status has been conferred by representation at coalition meetings. As of November 2025, Japan and Albania were the latest of 34 countries reported to have joined MNF-U.

Operationally inactive and open for contributors to join while remaining in planning phase, the force had yet to determine its size and operational areas of responsibility. In September 2025, UK parliamentary statements from Defense Secretary Luke Pollard, and written answers in the UK Defence Journal, confirmed that UK was first to publicly acknowledge designation of its military contingent and units for MNF-U duty, including rotating headquarters, though operational details remain confidential for security reasons.

Additionally, MNF-U represents a conceptual evolution in European security planning, being established as a non-standing military force – outside EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – designed for post-ceasefire peace enforcement, deterrence, and military regeneration in Ukraine. Formally launched as a 'coalition of the willing' in March 2025, the MNF-U’s formation, led by France and the United Kingdom, serves as a direct operationally focused response to the perceived erosion of US security commitments, an imperative confirmed by contemporary Chatham House analysis.

Expert analysis from institutions including RUSI, IISS, The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) and SIPRI validates the structural choices made by the MNF-U planners. The force’s mandate is to be centered on functioning as a "capacity-building force," specifically designed to internalize large-scale training missions (such as Operation Interflex) into Ukraine, and to provide specialized security capabilities (naval mine-clearing and air policing). While its intrinsic combat capability for deterrence is limited, its political strength lies in the "tripwire" function by the entanglement of 34 contributing nations in the event of renewed aggression, a model analyzed by RUSI.

MNF-U’s status – though in planning phase with deployment pending ceasefire – has become subject of legal and political debates. As of late 2025, the initiative advanced planning lacks command assignments, force size, legal instruments (including Status of Forces Agreements–SOFA), and funding mechanisms, as well as subjects pending formal national approvals.

Background

First mentioned in March 2025, as a coalition stabilization and peacekeeping future force (with 34 nation-contributors by December) MNF-U was formalized in October 2025 by France and the United Kingdom. Conceived as a rapid deployment force in response to a ceasefire in Russo-Ukrainian war, when comprehensively agreed, it is to operate with English as its working language and under extended multinational agreements. MNF-U's expected mandate to support a comprehensive ceasefire and post-war stabilization in Ukraine includes military logistics, training, force generation, naval mine‑clearing, and air policing.

Its planned command structure is divided between a joint command headquarters in Paris and a coordination headquarters in Kyiv, with a French three‑star commander in Paris and a British two‑star deputy in Kyiv.

As a multinational security assistance initiative, it is established to provide post‑conflict advisory, training, and logistical support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and the wider security sector. Coordination headquarters in Kyiv, responsible for operative planning and coordination, is to be led by the United Kingdom, which provides core logistical and administrative staff and bears costs associated with maintaining it. Additionally, rotating headquarters, initially set up in Paris, reflect operational presence and strategic oversight. MNF‑U was planned to operate under a non‑combat mandate, in line with coalition statements made in late 2025. Deployment of the full contingent is conditional upon the verified cessation of major hostilities and the establishment of reliable cease‑fire terms.

The MNF-U is strategically designed for a hybrid role: it functions both as a 'reassurance force', providing a visible presence to bolster Ukraine's security and political resolve, and as a 'deterrence', signaling that aggression against secure Ukrainian territory risks escalating conflict with the troop contributing nations. The force's mandate is tied to competing diplomatic proposals for defining the war's desired end state. For instance, the European counterproposal prioritized robust security guarantees (CSIS Provision 5), while the U.S. draft plan focused on establishing a demilitarized zone (DMZ) on Ukrainian soil (CSIS Provision 21). This demilitarized zone framework was politically rejected by Russia. President Putin explicitly opposed the force's presence in November 2025, demanding an "explicit ban" on Western deployments and conditioning a ceasefire on Ukraine’s unilateral territorial withdrawal from Donbas. Prompted by the need to establish credible security guarantees for Ukraine in response to the security discourse surrounding its post-conflict environment, the force's eventual mandate is tied to the complex diplomatic proposals defining the potential peace agreement. An initial 28-point U.S. draft plan was widely circulated and characterized as "pro-Russian," including provisions for establishing a DMZ. Following intense US-Ukrainian talks in Geneva on November 23, 2025, the controversial 28-point plan was significantly revised, resulting in an updated 19-point proposal more acceptable to Ukraine.

The feasibility of deploying a force like the MNF–U is directly affected by the key unresolved issue of security guarantees within the peace framework. The initial U.S. 28-point plan contained terms that would have explicitly "prevented [European] states, though not consulted, from deploying forces in Ukraine." In contrast, the European counterproposals aimed to provide "Article 5-style" guarantees via a coalition of states ready to deploy on Ukrainian territory. The resolution of this fundamental disagreement — specifically, the status of foreign military deployment and the definition of security guarantees — is one of two critical questions awaiting decision at the highest level.

As of December 2025, negotiations on the final framework continue. As negotiations entered this phase, the central unresolved question remained whether, and under what legal authority, a reassurance force like MNF‑U would be authorized to deploy on Ukrainian soil as part of the post‑conflict security arrangements. The MNF-U's structure, mandate, and legitimacy remained points of discussion not only among governments but also within the media and academic communities across Europe and beyond, predated by research as early as late 2023.

International law and peace enforcement for Ukraine

The proposed non‑combat role of the MNF‑U requires a clearly articulated legal framework that reconciles international peacekeeping and humanitarian norms with Ukraine’s sovereignty and explicit consent. Key elements — the legal status of multinational personnel, criminal and civil jurisdiction, and the force's chain of command — are to be defined through a comprehensive Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), supported by implementing domestic legislation and, where appropriate, a UN or regional mandate. The SOFA should specify military structure relationships (operational command, tactical control, and national command), immunity and accountability arrangements, and procedures for revocation of consent or mandate adjustment. This negotiation draws on concrete lessons from past stabilization missions — such as the need for unambiguous rules of engagement and host‑nation coordination observed in IFOR and SFOR — to ensure legal clarity, operational coherence, and political legitimacy.

Historical context of multinational engagements in Ukraine

The structure and scale of multinational peace operations in Ukraine must be understood against a backdrop of historical peacekeeping and Ukraine's evolving national defense doctrine. Since 1992, Ukraine has dispatched military contingents to over twenty UN, NATO, and OSCE missions, deploying more than 45,000 personnel abroad and suffering casualties. Notably, Ukraine's peacekeeping contributions persisted into Russia's 2014-2022 aggression, reflecting both a domestic commitment to multilateralism and the external recognition of Ukraine's capability and reliability as a contributor.

With the 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine withdrew most peacekeepers for home defense, but the tradition underpins receptivity to a future international stabilization mission under multilateral auspices. The concept of a Multinational Force-Ukraine echoes earlier multinational stabilization efforts, including the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai Peninsula, and the current one in planning – International Stabilization Force in Gaza Strip. The MNF-U proposal adapts recommendation by Dr. Bardalai, retired Major General, as well as Ukraine–NATO relationship, which deepened rapidly after Russia's invasion in 2022.

Legal basis of the mission

The legal architecture for the MNF-U's peacekeeping mission has been evolving amid UN precedent and international law. Deployment is to occur only with a comprehensive, signed ceasefire or peace deal, respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and the norms prohibiting intervention in active conflicts without host-country consent. Rules of engagement, status of forces, and chain of command are being negotiated in detail, taking lessons from previous 'coalition of the willing'.

As of November 2025, lack of specific 'reassurance force in Ukraine' legal analysis highlights the risks of ambiguity in force mandate, especially in the context of 'robust peace enforcement' (as opposed to traditional peacekeeping).

Founding and contributors

Retrospective timeline of the MNF-U
Present September 2025 March 28, 2025
Geopolitical period    Second Trump    administration 20 JAN 2025 322 days→ 20 JAN 2029−1139 days
Status	Not formally mandated legally & internationally as of December 2025
Establishment	as Kyiv Coordinating HQ founded
History
• Commander	as assigned and named
• Deputy commander	c. October 2025 (assigned unnamed)
• HQ Paris foundation	c. September 2025 (with staff ~60)
• Command structure	July 17, 2025 (2025-07-17) (revealed publicly)
• Title determination	March 28, 2025 (2025-03-28) (revealed in written)
Footnotes

Ad hoc multinational crisis response coalition force outside the EU's Crisis Response Operation Core, MNF-U is to be established amidst speculative scenarios concerning Ukraine’s postwar security and the anticipated need for a rapid, 'boots-on-the-ground' peacekeeping or reassurance force, deployed upon a ceasefire or peace agreement. Its formal launch as a coalition of the willing – a Europe-led mechanism for providing concrete security guarantees to Ukraine – was in March 2025 at the London "Securing Our Future" summit, co-hosted by British Prime minister Keir Starmer and French president Emmanuel Macron.

Flags of participants behind Minister Keir Starmer as he prepares to host a European Leaders Summit at Lancaster House on March 3, 2025.

The foundational MNF-U command's structural node in Paris was set in September amid growing solidarity among European leaders and Asian Pacific coalition partners, though the deterrent effect of a European non-combat future force on the ground in Ukraine stays unclear.

Chronology

MNF-U mission outline (abbr. CoW • MNF-U)
10 July 2025 • present • D-day  Immediate operational environment
NATO eastern flank Ukraine southern frontiers
Administrative map Originally published by UN OCHA February 2024
As of 1 December 2025 Coalition allies   Non-participant EU/NATO member states   Opposing belligerents Russia, Belarus, North Korea Mission statement   Meant unclassified
Status	• Components in development • Not internationally mandated
Location	Coordinating HQ
Coordinating HQ (CHQ)	Kyiv, Ukraine
Official languages	English French
Contributors	34 countries, NATO, EU
Type	Rapid deployment force
Foundation	c. SEP 2025 (as HQ Paris)
Leaders
• French Republic	President Macron
• United Kingdom	Prime minister Starmer
Establishment	Ongoing (as Kyiv CHQ)
Historical era	Russo-Ukrainian War
• Lancaster Declaration	July 10, 2025 (2025-07-10)
• HQ Paris inauguration	November 17, 2025 (2025-11-17)
• Established
Time zone	EET UTC+02:00/EEST UTC+03:00
Area of future operations
• CoW retrospective timeline Current phase Present March 2, 2025 (2025-03-02) November 11, 2024 (2024-11-11) Status International coalition of the willing Location Permanent HQ not established Modus operandi Regular coalition meetings Official languages English French Summits co-chairs     Summits • Ministerials French president UK prime minister German chancellor 11 • 2 as of NOV2025 Type Multinational ceasefire enforcement mission for rapid military deployment Membership eligibility Voluntary contributing nations by invitation Establishment bulleted points dated retrospectively Historical era Russo-Ukrainian war (2022–present) ongoing for 1384 days • Mission end state • MNF-U HQ Paris Intact for 78 days • Coalition of the Willing (CoW) Intact for 282 days  March 2, 2025 (2025-03-02) (formed)  November 2024 (2024-11) (agreed) Today part of Designing MNF-U structural components and Ukraine's postwar security guarantees Aims Four point-plan Pledge     Firm commitment to Ukraine's defense and security politically; cautious escalation operationally Footnotes

Administrative framework of the force advanced significantly throughout 2025. In the first half of the year, foundational elements were put in place, starting with the determination of the title, first attested on March 27. Following this, the specific command structure was voiced on July 17. By September, the initiative had progressed to the formation of the Joint Command Headquarters in Paris (abbr. JCHQ), establishing a centralized body to oversee the developing coalition force.

Financial and logistical coordination accelerated during the fourth quarter. On October 20, the United Kingdom finalized its cost allocation, securing a funding for the initiative. Diplomatic efforts intensified in November, featuring expert consultations among Coalition of the Willing (CoW) security-advising directors in Madrid on November 4, followed by a headquarters site visit in Paris on November 17, and formation of the CoW group on security guarantees for Ukraine announced on November 25.

Despite this progress, the force remained without a formal mandate as of November, with the establishment of Kyiv Coordination Headquarters contingent upon a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The MNF-U initiative at the London Summit in March 2025 has been an attempt to structure military security guarantees outside of the NATO framework demonstrating measured political will across 34 coalition nations. This initial planning phase defined deterrence objectives, a command structure, unveiled in July, logistical and administrative costs, budgeted by the UK, and Paris HQ location, revealed by France, confirmed consequently in October and November.

However, continued reliance on political consensus, rather than finalized legal and operational agreements, has introduced critical vulnerabilities. Since the coalition's foundation, the legal ambiguity has centered on the absence of a signed Status of forces agreement (SOFA), which defines the status of military personnel. Operational deployment is further complicated by the need for individual parliamentary authorizations across multiple nations and the lack of clarity on Rules of engagement (ROE).

This situation has been viewed by analysts as representing unresolved consensus among participants rather than simple administrative delay: defining the military authority of a 'peace enforcement' force operating directly adjacent to a major nuclear-armed adversary. Until these instruments are defined, the mission’s effectiveness as a deterrent is limited, and its legal basis remains contestable.

As of 27 November 2025, the force remained prepared for deployment only upon verified cessation of major hostilities and resolution of outstanding legal ambiguities. On 1 December 2025, president Volodymyr Zelensky met Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace in Paris. Le Monde reported that Macron said there was not yet a finalized plan regarding Ukrainian Russia-occupied territorial questions. The Élysée palace communiqué confirmed the meeting was linked to the Coalition of the willing summit of 25 November and highlighted reinforced Franco‑Ukrainian defense cooperation. Le Figaro noted that the press-conference focused on themes of a peace plan, security guarantees, and Ukraine's corruption, while RFI described the visit as Zelensky’s tenth to France since 2022.

As of December 2025, the Multinational Force — Ukraine (MNF‑U) has not been reported to assign named commander or to form its coordinating headquarters in Kyiv to move the initiative from planning into an operational coordination posture. The Kyiv cell has been planed to serve as the coalition’s forward liaison with Ukrainian authorities and troop contributing countriess, concentrating on financial, logistical and political coordination while strategic command responsibilities stay with coalition node in Paris.

Contributors and funding

As of November 2025, 34 nations had been reported as contributors, ranging from major European allies to smaller states pledging limited contingents. Troop contributions were expected to vary: UK and France were to anchor command and provide high‑readiness forces; European allies were expected to supply ground troops; US support was discussed in terms of logistics and air/ISR backstop, with early public exclusion of direct ground deployment. Troop contribution pledgers included NATO members and some non-NATO partners from Asia Pacific region. While many contributors confined their deployments pledges to support or training tasks, others are to take on more direct security roles. In an interview with Fox News on 19 August 2025, President Trump suggested that US (the non-coalition partner nation) air support was a possibility but ruled out US troops on the ground.

MNF-U’s composition is intentionally European, both symbolically and practically, with defense burden-sharing mechanisms reflecting an emphasis on collective action and sustainable financing. Since March 2021, EU has been providing military equipment and training to AFU, among others, through its European Peace Facility (EPF). But this is the first time the bloc has, in its history, approved the supply of lethal weapons to a third country using EU funding, some streams of which are under consideration for potential MNF-U cost allocation.

Organization, command and control structure

On 17 July 2025, UK defence secretary unveiled the planned military structure of the Multinational Force–Ukraine organized under the MNF-U Commander (COM MNF-U). Political leadership was announced as provided jointly by France and the United Kingdom, co-chairing regular summits of the coalition of the willing. Military command was announced as assigned to a French divisional general with rotation to a UK general officer twelve months after deployment.

Headquarters were distributed across Mont‑Valérien HQ in Paris, France, Northwood Headquarters, United Kingdom, and Kyiv, Ukraine. The command structure was modeled on multinational stabilization operations, with France and the UK as lead nations and other contributors expected to provide troops or specialized capabilities. MNF-U operational dates and legal mandate are contingent a ceasefire agreement.

Reaction and readiness

The proposed deployment of the Multinational Force–Ukraine (MNF–U) has elicited varied responses from participating states. Poland has ruled out sending troops but pledged logistical support for the coalition. Norway has not authorized deployments but remains active in planning and training roles. Russia has rejected any Western military presence in Ukraine, calling such deployments “fundamentally unacceptable.”

Potential US security guarantees

It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia, as well as to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state.

— National Security Strategy of the USA, November 2025

Details of what US support and coordination could look like are limited. In a post on Truth Social on 18 August 2025 President Trump said that security guarantees would be provided by various European countries in "coordination with the United States of America". He has made clear that any security guarantees will not be NATO-based guarantees. US military assistance will also not be supplied directly to MNF-U. Instead, the US is providing arms that are funded entirely by all NATO allies.

There is no clear US position toward the coalition of the willing because it is a European initiative and a European discussion. It is also peripheral to the second Trump administration's disjointed and confused peace negotiations. There was, for instance, no mention of such a force in the 28 point peace plan.

As of December 2025, the National Security Strategy (November 2025) states the United States will prioritize burden‑sharing and expect European allies to assume primary responsibility for regional security, including increased defense spending. Prior to that baroness Jenny Chapman, UK Minister of State, FCDO, in the 31 October parliament debate on Ukraine, responding to baroness Goldie regarding security guarantees, stated that MNF-U would be deployed to help secure Ukraine’s skies and seas and regenerate Ukraine’s armed forces once hostilities have ceased.

Belgium

Belgium has voiced strong political commitment to Ukraine, pledging support through humanitarian aid and F‑16 deliveries financed largely via Euroclear revenues. Yet decades of underinvestment leave its armed forces constrained, with new spending only beginning to reverse the trend. Any Belgian participation in MNF‑U would hinge on a credible ceasefire and is most likely to involve a modest air contribution, such as a handful of fighter jets. Larger land or naval deployments remain improbable given limited capacity and competing NATO obligations.

Canada

Canada expresses strong political solidarity with Ukraine and signals willingness to join a post‑ceasefire reassurance mission. Yet structural limitations of the Canadian Armed Forces mean its role would likely be confined to non‑combat functions such as training, logistics, and support.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic has shifted from an early high‑profile supporter of Ukraine to a more cautious stance under the incoming ANO‑led government. While participation in MNF‑U is not ruled out, troop deployments appear unlikely given domestic scepticism and limited military capacity.

Denmark

Denmark has positioned itself as a frontrunner in supporting Ukraine, donating major weapon systems and hosting training initiatives while maintaining one of the highest aid levels relative to GDP. Political consensus and strong public backing ensure commitment to a European security force, though the scale of Denmark’s contribution will depend on task requirements. Years of defence underinvestment leave the armed forces stretched, making only modest or specialized contributions feasible.

Estonia

Estonia has been among the strongest per‑capita supporters of Ukraine, contributing over 1.4% of GDP in military aid and consistently framing Ukraine’s security as inseparable from Europe’s. While the government has pledged readiness to send a company‑sized unit and naval assets, participation is conditional on a ceasefire, parliament approval and a clear mandate. Public opinion remains cautious, but Estonia’s leadership sees involvement in MNF‑U as strategically vital to shaping NATO’s future balance.

Finland

Analysts highlighted that Finland’s frontline realism, as outlined in a NUPI policy brief, stressed the need for mandate clarity and rules of engagement before committing to MNF-U participation.

France

France has taken a proactive leadership role in discussions on MNF‑U, with President Macron insisting that Western boots on the ground should not be excluded. Paris frames such a force as reassurance for Ukraine and deterrence against Russia, while signalling Europe’s willingness to shoulder more responsibility. Domestic politics and constitutional rules make French deployments comparatively easier, with limited parliamentary constraints and divided but not hostile public opinion. Militarily, France can field air, maritime, and even ground components, though sustainability under high‑intensity combat remains uncertain.

Germany

Germany participates in the coalition politically but has been hesitant to commit troops, reflecting internal political divisions led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who faces a domestic population wary of war.

Germany currently refers to its substantial contributions to NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and the EU’s Military Assistant Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA) to justify its reluctance for major contributions to the MNF-U existing lines of operations. Germany is however present with personnel in the HQ in France.

Italy

Italy categorically rejects deploying troops to Ukraine under the Coalition of the Willing, limiting its role to monitoring and training outside Ukrainian territory. This stance reflects Rome’s prioritisation of transatlantic alignment, with prime minister Meloni and defence minister Crosetto stressing loyalty to US preferences. Domestic politics and public opinion further constrain options. Consequently, Italy’s contribution would likely remain modest, focusing on air protection or training missions rather than sizeable ground forces.

Latvia

Despite strong political will, its modest force size and proximity to Russia limit the scope of potential MNF‑U contributions. As a result, Latvia is expected to focus on training missions under a NATO‑led framework rather than deploying frontline troops.

Lithuania

President Gitanas Nausėda has described the reassurance force concept as “a necessity”. Lithuania's conditions for participation include US backing, a clearly defined mission mandate, and the existence of a peace agreement or a stabilized ceasefire. Only 15 percent of those polled support country's defense forces deployment if allied forces also participate, and a similar share back sending troops solely for the purpose of training Ukrainian forces.

Lithuania is considering deploying roughly twenty instructors across different levels of command to assist the MNF-U.

Netherlands

The Netherlands has emerged as a major donor and steadfast supporter of Ukraine, linking its stance to international law, European security, and the legacy of MH17. Yet Dutch participation in MNF‑U remains contingent on US involvement, parliamentary consensus, and the limits of its recovering military capabilities.

Norway

The Norwegian parliament has not yet approved the deployment of forces into the multinational force for Ukraine, reflecting a cautious approach to military involvement. However, Norway has been actively participating in planning and has provided training to Ukrainian forces, indicating a commitment to the country's defense and security. The Norwegian Chief of Defence and his staff are involved in the planning of the multinational force, suggesting a level of engagement in the military aspects of the initiative.

Poland

Poland positioned itself as the coalition’s logistical backbone in MNF‑U, pledging infrastructure and coordination while firmly ruling out combat troop deployments.

Sweden

The Swedish Prime Minister has suggested that Sweden could potentially participate with air surveillance or naval forces, and the Minister of Defence has emphasized that no military options for involvement in Ukraine have been ruled out. In contrast, Swedish Armed Forces have limited capacity to contribute to a future MFU mission.

Turkey

As of November 2025, Turkey has been considering its peacekeepers to be stationed as part of MNF-U, but after ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine necessarily in effect for "any talks" on troop deployment to start.

United Kingdom

The UK under prime minister Starmer has positioned itself as a political leader of the Coalition of the Willing, alongside France, to sustain support for Ukraine as US commitment wanes. Strong parliamentary and public backing underpins this stance, though opinion narrows when asked about long‑term support "until Ukraine wins."

London, with France, has already established a multinational headquarters in Paris, preparing detailed plans for potential deployments despite uncertainty over mission conditions. According to NUPI, the UK could contribute a brigade and command assets, but sustaining such a force would strain its army and NATO commitments. This highlights the tension between Britain's ambition to lead and the practical limits of its expeditionary capacity.

Ukraine's needs

According to Ukraine's prime minister's office statement on 10 July 2025, Ukraine is ready to issue an invitation to the force and enter into formal agreements with participating nations as and when necessary.

Ukraine's operational needs include high end of the air domain – Strategic Aircraft and Air Defence Systems – a sector where Ukrainian capabilities are significantly overmatched by the adversary, and the necessity for support is urgent. There, MNF-U partners possess both the technical capacity and the moral legitimacy to intervene, in light of the violations of their own airspace.

In contrast, coalition partner nations currently lack the doctrine, organization, and capability to wage current type of war. However, allies could provide immediate value through land-based contributions, such as the counter-mine capacity from ashore that several states are positioned to offer. The functional scope of any future mission will correctly be limited to strategic non-combat rear support (intelligence, air defense, demining, and logistics).

Russia's opposition

Russia rejects the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine to monitor and enforce any peace agreement, calling it "demonstrably unviable". Earlier in the 2025, both President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer have said that the deployment of allied forces in Ukrainian territory was "not up to Russia to accept or not". On November 25, both reiterated their position. However, Russia has explicitly rejected these again, warning that any future deployment of Western troops—specifically those envisioned under the Franco-British "coalition of the willing"—would be unacceptable. President Putin affirmed Russia’s maximalist demands in November 2025, demanding that any final peace deal must include an "explicit ban" on the deployment of Western forces.

MNF-U design overview

The Multinational Force–Ukraine (MNF-U), also referred to as the deterrence and reassurance force, is the international political coalition – and a planned military contingent formation – formalized in response to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Its primary objective is to support Ukraine's sovereignty and security through deterrence, reassurance, and post-war stabilization efforts. The design of the MNF-U parallels and is informed by NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which was launched in 1993 to provide flexible, rapidly deployable multinational and multiservice task forces for missions such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.

Like the CJTF model, MNF-U features a modular command structure built around a headquarters nucleus, augmented by national contingents specific to mission requirements, thereby ensuring interoperability and readiness for rapid deployment.

Origin and creation

Emmanuel Macron, Volodymyr Zelensky, Keir Starmer (pictured L-R), Friedrich Merz and Donald Tusk (not pictured) at joint press conference. 10 May 2025, Mariinskyi Palace, Kyiv

Early discussions suggesting the possible creation of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine included the 2 March 2025 London Summit on Ukraine and a 10 May 2025 meeting hosted by Volodymyr Zelensky, president of Ukraine, and attended by European political leaders, including Emmanuel Macron, French president; Friedrich Merz, German chancellor; Keir Starmer, UK prime minister; and Donald Tusk, Polish prime minister.

The coalition expanded from sixteen founding nations and two organizations in March to a 33-member-state entity by August 2025.

While mission statement is pending, the MNF-U is described as a non-CSDP flexible armed force, designed to operate outside the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy framework (CSDP).

Expected mission and objectives

Stabilization (peacekeeping) mission as planned; since
(Russian invasion of Ukraine aftermath) Part of comprehensive ceasefire control UKRAINE | Territorial control as of October'25 Sources: AEI’s CTP; ISW
Areas effectively controlled by Russia in four oblasts, Autonomous Republic Crimea
Operational scope	Logistical, training expertise Force regeneration Naval mine-clearing Air policing
Locations	CHQ Kyiv  (Ukraine multiple) UKR 50.471432°N 30.52892°E / 50.471432; 30.52892 HQ Paris (Joint Command HQ) FRA 48.872828°N 2.213313°E / 48.872828; 2.213313
Planned	on IOC phase horizon
Planned by	Joint Command HQ
Commanded by	(based in Paris HQ) 3 star COM French Army (to be based in Kyiv CHQ) 2* DCOM British Army
Objective	Enforcing buffer zones: DMZs, etc. Reconstitution, training of the host's land, air, naval forces Timely delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction materials
Date	Deployment day (D-day) HH:MM:ss   (EET UTC+02:00/EEST UTC+03:00)
Executed by	DCOM CHQ/COM JCHQ with
Outcome	Ceasefire operationalizing Legal basis:    Command structure revealed Force components defined UK MNF-U FY2026 cost allocated Paris co-rotating HQ founded
Ukraine JCHQ MNF-UKRAINE future operational area out of Mont-Valérien JCHQ, Paris, France Kyiv CHQ Paris London class=notpageimage| MNF-U HQ | Mont-Valérien • Northwood; Kyiv Notes Initial strength   ~25,000–30,000 personnel (equiv. of 4-5 brigades)   Full capability   To surge per operational needs UKRAINE | Topography, logistics, geology (Source map: Cartography of Ukraine) Kyiv Kherson class=notpageimage| RELIEF i.a. Southern front, Black and Azov seas Khersonskyi raion (see inset below)

Cereals EXPORT LOGISTICS, UKRAINE
Originally published by USDA, June 2025

DEPOSITS discovered as of 2025

KHERSONSKYI RAION Settlements, roads
Originally published by UN OHCHR, May 2025

The planning record identifies the United Kingdom and France as the political leaders of the initiative and traces formal planning activity to March 2025, with public statements and parliamentary briefings documenting the process through mid and late 2025. Official timelines in the planning materials note UK's prime ministerial and defence ministry engagements in March and July 2025, and a Coalition chairs' statement on 25 November 2025 recording broad international participation.

The operation's stated scope in the planning documents lists a set of discrete mission lines: humanitarian assistance; specialist targeting expertise; force regeneration through logistics, armament and training experts; naval mine‑clearing; and air policing and air mobility support, together with reconstruction and buffer‑zone tasks. These capability strands are presented as the core functional elements that planners expect the multinational construct to deliver.

Activation and legal arrangements are recorded as conditional: deployment is tied to the commencement of a comprehensive, verifiable ceasefire and to a formal invitation and legal instruments with the host country, including status‑of‑forces agreements and agreed rules of engagement. Planning materials record the start date as the start of the day of the ceasefire agreement and leave end dates and legal details to be determined.

On force size and composition, publicly available documents record that no finalized troop numbers were provided during the planning phase. Planners have catalogued component tasks and cost items and described modular capabilities, but the materials state that overall force size and deployment sequencing remain to be determined pending ceasefire verification, national approvals, and the resolution of legal and operational caveats. As of December 2025, MNF-U's stated mission objective has included:

• strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities across land, sea, and air;
• designing post-war security guarantees for Ukraine;
• supporting peace negotiations in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Designed as the force organization with an ad hoc non-standing army, and its planning — including financial burden-sharing — at an advanced stage, the MNF-U has not been expected to be headquartered permanently: only rotating HQ with Kyiv 'coordination cell' is designated for command, control and communication.

Contributors and partners

Online meeting of the coalition on 13 August 2025

In addition to 34 contributing nations from Europe, the Commonwealth, and the Asia-Pacific, the coalition's partners include:

• the United States,
• European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA),
• NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU),
• US Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U), Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG–U).

Opposing entities

Perceived by policymakers opponents are:

• Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and
• Russia with its armed forces.

Doctrinal constraints and potential dynamics

As a coalition, MNF-U has been remaining politically active but militarily nascent by the end of 2025.

Planned as rapidly deployable, multi-national, multi-service force, it is consistent with established protocols for international military collaboration and previous operational planning disclosures. MNF-U was not mandated as of September 2025, despite the political coalition (CoW) being active and Paris HQ founded. As of December 2025, Kyiv HQ location is yet to be determined.

The funding mechanism has been expected to involve the European Peace Facility (EPF), indicating a hybrid financial arrangement leveraging existing EU mechanisms. Formal allocation decisions were pending EU budgetary procedures and national approvals. In contrast, the legal basis has been suggested by experts of Public International Law & Policy Group and Baker McKenzie as being outside EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, which is governed by Articles 42-46 of the Treaty on European Union, outlining the EU's defense policy and operational capabilities; thus underscoring mission's ad hoc, non-treaty nature.

Doctrinal and structural alignment (pre-September 2025)

MNF-U is an analog of the CJTF model, designed for stabilization operations outside formal alliance defense mandates:

• Combined - involves the forces of multiple nations as troops contributing countries (TCC);
• Joint - objective as a coalition rapid deployment force necessitates Army, Navy, and Air force contributions for the mission;
• Task - to be organized for the specific purpose – deployment upon agreed ceasefire.

The force command and control (C2) procedural and human interoperability across the TCC has been planned in consistency with usual protocols for international collaboration. Operational tempo of the mission demands the ability to be generated rapidly and at short notice.

MNF-U potential dynamics and end state

On November 5, 2025 in Bodø, Norway, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) — a UK-led multinational force of 10 Northern and Eastern European nations — formally launched an Enhanced Partnership with Ukraine.

This decision, made by JEF defence ministers, was approved to grant Ukraine the status of "Advanced Partner" in the JEF. European observers characterized the JEF's actions as a "bypass of NATO's sluggishness and bureaucracy". This confirms a strategic trend in European defense planning toward flexible, rapid-response coalitions. The JEF’s decision was explicitly described as a "strong message to Russian President Vladimir Putin" regarding the collective strength and operational responsiveness of the UK-led military alliances.

Timelines and phasing

Timelines for activation, initial operational capability, deployment or transition to full operational capability are expected to be in phases.

Exit strategy and end state

The assessment criteria for the MNF-U are to be drawn from a planning manual to help the central leadership team measure progress toward achieving complete readiness. This strict process is vital because, as a large international team, the success benchmarks must confirm that the various national units can overcome the "significant challenges" of working together smoothly and managing cultural differences. Additionally, mission success is evaluated by constantly tracking key indicators to determine how effectively the force achieves the specific peacekeeping and stability results it was mandated to deliver.

Furthermore, the overarching purpose of these assessments is to confirm whether the Multinational Force has successfully achieved the desired end state, which represents the specific set of stable conditions—political, security, and humanitarian—that signal the completion of its mission, confirming that the current peace negotiations are focused on defining the 'robust security guarantees' and 'stable conditions' necessary for a successful and lasting resolution. As of November 2025, there were no mention of criteria for mission success assessment, conditions for withdrawal, or the envisioned end state for the MNF-U's presence in Ukraine. Its "desired end state" has been a matter of diplomatic debate, with the Coalition of the Willing pushing for "robust security guarantees" (Provision 5) and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Russia-occupied territories, whereas the US draft plan proposed a demilitarized zone on Ukrainian soil under Russian jurisdiction (Provision 21).

The planning framework design for MNF‑U also echoes earlier multinational arrangements such as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai, where alternative legal bases and specific command structures were employed when UN authorization proved unattainable, underscoring how precedents outside the UN system inform MNF‑U’s design.

Operational planning overview

On 17 November 2025, President Volodymyr Zelensky joined French President Emmanuel Macron and senior officers of the MNF-U headquarters near Paris for inaugural HQ visit to discuss the framework of the operational planning. Coverage by DWS News reported that the meeting focused on integrating MNF–U contingents into Ukrainian command structures, sequencing deployments beginning with Franco‑British units, and clarifying the mandate of the force as both deterrence and reassurance. Zelensky emphasized that the presence of allied troops would demonstrate enduring Western commitment to Ukraine’s security, while Macron described the force as a visible guarantee of solidarity.

MNF-U Headquarters Part of command structure
Operational-level military organization
Main building, Forteresse du Mont-Valérien. 2011
Founded	c. September 2025
Countries	As of November 2025: 16
Branch	Ground forces
Type	Combined operational multinational force HQ
Role	Command and control
Size	As of November 2025: 60 pers.
Co-rotating HQ Coordinating HQ Working language Translation	Northwood HQ, London, UK , Kyiv, Ukraine English English→Ukrainian
Commanders
Commander HQ Paris, France	(3-star ranked) French Army divisional general
Deputy Commander CHQ Kyiv, Ukraine	(2-star ranked) British Army major general
Footnotes

In addition to the briefing of HQ French officer, Ukrainian officers highlighted the multinational character of the effort, stating that "60 planners from sixteen countries are already working together on operational planning." This cooperation was presented as evidence of the coalition’s readiness to establish a functioning headquarters and to coordinate logistics, staging areas, and interoperability exercises. The HQ inauguration was therefore seen as a milestone in translating political commitments into concrete military strategy, underscoring both the scale of international involvement and the urgency of preparing MNF–U for deployment once a ceasefire framework is agreed. The UK House of Commons Library briefing stated that “since March 2025, several countries, led by the UK and France, have been working to develop a Coalition of the Willing to defend any peace deal that is eventually agreed in Ukraine,” situating the Paris meeting within a broader timeline of coalition planning.

Coalition's progression from foundational declaration to operational planning was impacted by decisions on force structure, commitment to multinational command, operationalization of ceasefire (prior to peace negotiations), and pledges of troop commitments. MNF-U’s operational doctrine centered on three core objectives: deterrence (demonstrating credible force to prevent violations), assurance of the ceasefire (serving as a "tripwire" against renewed aggression), and support for the regeneration of Ukraine’s military institutions; the mission was defined as strictly non-offensive, with its armaments and rules of engagement proportional to self-defense and area security needs.

Deployment plans and force composition

Deployment was planned to be phased according to the terms of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. Initial targeted size was reported as 25,000–30,000 personnel, with flexibility to scale as conditions evolved. As of September 2025, according to Ukrainian officials, early planning envisaged 4–5 mechanized brigades, with high-readiness battalions during initial phases and the ability to surge additional units.

The figure of 25,000–30,000 personnel represents the indicative contingent size discussed by the Coalition of the Willing for the Multinational Force–Ukraine (MNF-U) deployment following a ceasefire, a figure consistently reported by international news outlets citing diplomatic and planning sources. This planned target has been noted as challenging to assemble due to personnel shortages across participating European nations.

Participation levels

will vary: UK and France will anchor command and provide high-readiness forces; European allies may supply ground troops; US support could be focused on logistics, and air/ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) "backstop", with early public exclusion of direct ground deployment.

Planned strength and capabilities

According to Andriy Yermak, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, targeted initial deployment size is 4-5 mechanized brigades, although flexibility built into the force structure allows scaling as conditions evolve. Force generation is planned with high-readiness battalions during early phases, and the ability to surge additional units if required. The model allows for national caveats specifics but mandates unity of command in the event of crisis response.

Potential operational area overview

According to the RAND Corporation research report on ceasefire scenarios dated July 2025, there were some underlying assumptions relevant to the MNF-U's operational planning detailed below.

Geographic scope and sectorization

MNF-Ukraine area of operations might encompass:

• The entirety of uncontested Ukrainian territory, with particular focus on newly demilitarized zones (DMZs) or regions adjacent to the frontlines.

  

  The two biggest remaining Ukrainian-controlled cities in Donetsk region, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, as part of proposed DMZ for Ukraine in 28-point draft plan

• Buffer areas, including potential DMZs, along ceasefire lines and international borders, especially the Russia-Ukraine border in the east and northeast and, potentially, boundary around Crimea (though it likely requires a different arrangement).
• Sectorization, whereby the country is partitioned into zones of responsibility, drawing inspiration from the Multinational Force and Observers model (Zones A, B, C) to facilitate monitoring and management. These zones support both separation of forces and confidence-building measures, and allow for tailored mandates by sector: geographically, main potential monitoring areas can be clustered with 4 sectors.

Ukraine relief map (see footnote above for sectors)

Demilitarized zones, other buffer areas

According to the RAND Corporation research, buffer areas serve to prevent inadvertent clashes and to maintain spatial separation of hostile forces – classical features of post-ceasefire stability: inner buffer lines, external frontiers contour, and flexible, adaptable arrangements contingent on the ceasefire’s terms. To ensure transparency and incident reporting, neutral observers, as well as sensoring surveillance equipment, are to be placed.

The report's first top-line recommendation is the inclusion of DMZs into potential ceasefire agreement along the line of contact: they raise the costs of breaking a ceasefire with physical obstacles. Additionally, DMZs "have to vary in width according to the particular geography; for example, there are some population centers that abut the line of contact as of this writing, and they might require additional protections."

Planning and execution prospects

Joint Anglo-French/Franco-British command arrangement

Though an unprecedented arrangement for Ukraine – above Kyiv two-star operational headquarters – MNF-U's three-star strategic command is to be jointly exercised by the UK and France. This joint structure allows for 'shared sovereign' oversight while maintaining operational unity of command, and is expected to remain even if the command center relocates (from Paris to London, as planned). In line with tested CJF model of rotating HQ under modernized treaty, this dual-level command, in a clear operational–strategic split, is designed to maximize coordination and assure NATO and partner nations of routine oversight.

Integration of national and international elements

Additionally, MNF-U command arrangements include liaison structures, coordination cells, and embedded staff from the coalition states, including Ukraine. This composition harmonizes rules of engagement, logistics workflows, reporting discipline, and interoperability. Communicating is a factor: English is established as the working language, thus, staff of the MNF-U are expected to profess in multinational doctrines and protocols, with its potential parent unit in the chain of command remaining under consideration.

Expected support and finance

The MNF-U’s structure emphasizes integrated logistics components, drawing on lessons in multinational sustainment. As of November 2025, the challenge of equitable and sustainable MNF-U burden-sharing is likely to be acute, given the size of the projected force and the political complexity of funding defense in a European context.

Funding mechanism

MNF-U is anticipated to be primarily funded through collective European, NATO, and EU mechanisms, supplemented by national contributions, both financial and in-kind, from coalition partners, and with some limited US in-kind support in the form of ISR and equipment.The European Peace Facility, in particular, has played a role in enabling the EU to provide substantial support to Ukraine since the onset of the Russian invasion. One of the most significant steps taken by the EU was the launch of the Military Assistance Mission in Support of Ukraine (EUMAM UA) in 2022.

Funds sourcing options

As available data allow, given the EU investment frameworks and US strategic support, and as referenced in contemporary analyses and EU funding legislative summaries, planned financing streams are to include:

• EU’s European Peace Facility (EPF) or the UN-assessed funds;
• contributions of the 'coalition of the willing' states;
• ad hoc mechanisms (e.g., supplemental US or EU grants).

All participating nations are expected to contribute to their own contingent’s personnel in-kind, but the costs for command, logistics, and multinational operations may be apportioned according to pre-agreed formulas reflecting NATO/common EU procedures. EU defense expenditure has increased sharply, projected to reach €381 billion in 2025, and defense investments have grown by over 40% compared to earlier levels. Initiatives such as the Ukraine Assistance Fund within the EPF – backed by up to €50 billion (2024-2027) – could provide an explicit structure for funding stabilization, reconstruction, and military support to Ukraine, though direct MNF-U operational costs may fall outside such civilian-focused instruments.

MNF-U critical dependencies

The NUPI policy brief Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine (Karlsrud & Reykers) frames the MNF‑U as a project requiring conditional planning. The authors establish a checklist of political and operational prerequisites, most notably a ceasefire or peace agreement as a deployment trigger, a Paris‑based three‑star headquarters, and prearranged rotation and sustainment schemes.

In the Foreign Policy column "Ukraine Can Only Rely on Itself", Vohra complements this roadmap by arguing that external guarantees are inherently fragile. The column asserts that Ukraine’s own military resilience must remain the primary bulwark.

Regarding operational design, Karlsrud and Reykers recommend prioritizing tasks feasible without immediate US combat deployment, such as air‑defense integration, maritime mine countermeasures, logistics, and training. To align domestic constituencies with coalition risk tolerances, the brief advises that legal workstreams, Rules of Engagement, and exit criteria be finalized publicly in advance. The authors further warn that interoperability plans must match realistic force‑generation profiles to ensure mandates do not outstrip contributor capacities. Conversely, Vohra underscores that strategic communications should emphasize parallel investments in Ukraine’s force modernization and recruitment. To preserve coalition cohesion, the analysts suggest that escalation management mechanisms be codified to address potential accidental or deliberate incidents.

In addition, the existence of the CoW/MNF-U creates a de facto two-tier alliance. One tier (led by the US) is disengaging from direct involvement on Ukraine soil to prioritize other theaters or isolationism. The second tier (led by UK/France) is preparing for forward deployment into a volatile zone not triggering NATO Article 5 if attacked. As the deployment would be 'out of area' of NATO and voluntary, the ambiguity weakens the coalition’s deterrent value.

In contrast, the creation of the MNF-U command's structural node in Paris, together with the agreement on 5% NATO defence spending by 2035, is the concrete step toward a European defense capability independent of the US.

See also

Inquiry into Australian support for Ukraine by Australian Government

• Armed Forces of Ukraine international deployments – Combined military forces of Ukraine
• August 2025 White House multilateral meeting on Ukraine – Meeting between European leaders and the U.S. president over Ukraine on August 18, 2025
• Combined Joint Expeditionary Force – Joint UK–French multi-component expeditionary force (rebranded Combined Joint Force [CJF] since July 2025)
• Defence forces of the European Union
• International Stabilization Force – United Nations mandated multinational peacekeeping force for the Gaza Strip
• Joint Expeditionary Force – UK-led Northern European multi-national rapid response and expeditionary force
• Joint Centre of Control and Coordination – 2014-17 ceasefire-monitoring and safety-enforcement organization
• Kosovo Force – NATO-led international peacekeeping force
• Lancaster House 2.0 – 2010 treaties between United Kingdom and France, with additional agreement of July 2025
• List of non-UN peacekeeping missions – List of current, historical and proposed peacekeeping missions outside the UN
• List of United Nations peacekeeping missions – List of all former and current United Nations peacekeeping missions
• Multinational Joint Commission – Military training mission to Ukraine
• Multi-National Force – Iraq – United States-led military command in Iraq from 2004 to 2009
• Multinational Force in Lebanon – International peacekeeping force in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984
• Operation Atlantic Resolve – US deployments to Europe in response to Russo-Ukrainian War
• Operation Interflex – British training mission in Ukraine
• Operation Unifier – Canadian Armed Forces operation in Ukraine
• Readiness 2030 – European strategic defense initiative
• Victory Plan for Ukraine – Peace plan for Ukraine proposed in October 2024
• Weimar+ – Intergovernmental alliance of EU nations and the UK
• Ukraine's Peace Formula – 2022 Ukrainian diplomatic initiative proposed worldwide to simply end the war with Russia

Ukraine's Peace Formula Philosophy by Volodymyr Zelensky

External links

• Ukraine – Fact Check
• War in Ukraine - Fact Check
• OSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (August 1, 1975)
• European Council – G7: Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine (July 12, 2023)
• Razumkov Centre – Identity of Ukrainian Citizens: Trends of Change (May, 2023) (August 24, 2023)
• Emmanuel Macron – Europe—It Can Die. A New Paradigm at the Sorbonne (Speech) (April 26, 2024)
• Defence expenditures and NATO's 5% commitment