🇮🇷 Iran Proxy | https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Kravchuk
Jump to content

Leonid Kravchuk

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Hero of Ukraine
Leonid Kravchuk
Леонід Кравчук
Kravchuk in 1991
1st President of Ukraine
In office
5 December 1991 – 19 July 1994
Acting: 24 August – 5 December 1991
Prime Minister
Preceded byMykola Plaviuk (as the last President in exile)[a]
Himself (as Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada)
Succeeded byLeonid Kuchma
1st Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada
In office
24 August 1991 – 5 December 1991
Preceded byHimself (as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet)
Succeeded byIvan Plyushch
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR
In office
23 July 1990 – 24 August 1991
Preceded byVladimir Ivashko
Ivan Plyushch (acting)
Succeeded byHimself (as Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and President of Ukraine)
People's Deputy of Ukraine
In office
15 May 1990 – 5 December 1991
ConstituencyVinnytsia Oblast, Yampil (1990–1991)
In office
25 September 1994 – 25 May 2006
Constituency
Personal details
Born(1934-01-10)10 January 1934
Żytyń Wielki, Poland
(now Velykyi Zhytyn, Ukraine)
Died10 May 2022(2022-05-10) (aged 88)
Munich, Bavaria, Germany
Resting placeBaikove Cemetery, Kyiv
PartySocial Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (1994–2009)
Other political
affiliations		Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1958–1991)
Independent (1991–1994)
Spouse
​
(m. 1957)​
Children1
Residence(s)Koncha-Zaspa, Kyiv, Ukraine
Alma mater
OccupationPolitician
Signature
Leonid Kravchuk's voice
Kravchuk during a press conference with U.S. president Bill Clinton
Recorded 12 January 1994
Part of a series on
Socialism in Ukraine
Principles
Ideologies
Intellectuals
Politicians
Parties
Active
Defunct

Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk[b] (Ukrainian: Леонід Макарович Кравчук, IPA: [leoˈn⁽ʲ⁾id mɐˈkɑrowɪtʃ krɐu̯ˈtʃuk]; 10 January 1934 – 10 May 2022) was a Ukrainian politician who was the first president of Ukraine, serving from 5 December 1991 until 19 July 1994. Kravchuk's presidency was marked by Ukraine achieving independence from the Soviet Union, the handover of its post-Soviet nuclear arsenal and an economic crisis that ultimately resulted in him losing re-election. Prior to his presidency, he was Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. After leaving office, he served as a People's Deputy of Ukraine from the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united).

Born to a family of peasants in Volhynia, Kravchuk's early life was significantly impacted by World War II and the postwar nationalist insurgency. He joined the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1958 and rose through the ranks, working as a propagandist. He became Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in 1990, amidst the 1989–1991 Ukrainian revolution and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. He opposed the 1991 Soviet coup attempt and subsequently led Ukraine to become independent from the Soviet Union.

Kravchuk became Ukraine's first democratically-elected president in 1991. As president, Kravchuk formed an informal alliance between his national communists and national democrats, an ideological group succeeding Ukraine's Soviet dissidents. He sought to build a centralised state, opposing federalism, and established an independent Armed Forces of Ukraine, additionally giving up Ukraine's nuclear arsenal. He supported the possibility of Ukrainian membership in the NATO military alliance.

Kravchuk's presidency saw the enrichment of the former nomenklatura and a failure to undertake economic reforms, caused by uncertainty over the correct measures to take. Ukraine's gross domestic product contracted by 40% during his time in office. In the wake of strikes by coal miners, Kravchuk called snap elections for Ukraine's parliament and presidency; he was defeated both times in 1994, being succeeded as president by Leonid Kuchma. After his presidency, Kravchuk remained active in Ukrainian politics, serving as a People's Deputy of Ukraine and the leader of the parliamentary group of the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) from 2002 to 2006.

Early life

[edit]

Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk was born on 10 January 1934[4][5] in the village of Velykyi Zhytyn (Żytyń Wielki) to an ethnic Ukrainian peasant family. At that time the village was part of the Second Polish Republic. It was annexed into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic after the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939, when Kravchuk was a child.[5] Kravchuk's father was connected to the Ukrainian nationalist underground, which resisted Polish rule over western Ukraine.[6]

Kravchuk's family belonged to the Eastern Orthodox Mykhailivska Church in Velykyi Zhytyn, and he later recounted that his family was deeply religious. Kravchuk's birth and baptismal records, recorded by the church, have since been lost; local newspaper Volyn [uk] speculated in 2018 that it may have been removed or destroyed at Kravchuk's behest in order to improve his image in Soviet circles as an atheist. As a child, Kravchuk shared his family's religious beliefs, and the first recorded mention of his name was around the Christmas of 1942, when an article by Ulas Samchuk in Nazi collaborator newspaper Volyn noted him among local children singing koliadky and donating 40 karbovantsiv to the Ukrainian Red Cross Society. Kravchuk later recalled that he became an atheist in his childhood, a fact he said his mother sought to change by seating him under icons to pray.[7] Kravchuk's parents worked under Polish landowners and his father served in the Polish Army before being killed in World War II.[5]

Kravchuk's childhood was significantly affected by World War II, especially the activities of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainian: Українська повстанська армія, romanised: Ukrainska povstanska armiia; UPA), which was active between 1943 and the late 1940s in western Ukraine. The UPA was particularly concentrated Kravchuk's native Volhynia. American historian and political scientist Alexander J. Motyl wrote in 1995 that "Unlike someone from the Sovietized parts of the country, Kravchuk was well aware of the armed struggle led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and of the 'insurgent republics' that served as pockets of sovereignty in the forests of Volhynia[.]" Motyl noted that the presence of nationalist mass movements in western Ukraine, including the OUN and the nationalist-influenced Communist Party of Western Ukraine, likely influenced Kravchuk's outlook towards communism and nationalism in a way that most other Soviet politicians did not experience.[8] Motyl also posits that Kravchuk's childhood experience living under German occupation was likely traumatic,[9] and Kravchuk later recounted that at the age of eight, he had watched Jews being executed with a machine gun.[10] According to Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, some newspapers since perestroika have claimed that Kravchuk secretly brought food to members of the UPA as a child.[11]

Kravchuk married a mathematics teacher, Antonina Mykhailivna Mishura, in 1957.[12][13] First Lady of the United States from 1989 to 1993, Barbara Bush (wife of 41st American president George H. W. Bush), described Antonina in her memoirs: "She was the nicest young woman, a math teacher with absolutely no interest in politics".[13] Kravchuk studied accounting at a vocational school in Rivne between 1950 and 1953 before attending Taras Shevchenko Kyiv State University.[14] Kravchuk graduated at 24, specialising in Marxist political economy, and began working as a teacher of political economy in the southwestern city of Chernivtsi before entering politics.[15] He took part in the International Visitor Leadership Program, a professional exchange run by the US State Department.[16]

Communist Party career

[edit]

Kravchuk joined the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1958 and became a member of the party apparatus in Chernivtsi Oblast in 1960. He later became a member of the Kyiv-based Central Committee of the CPU in 1970. Kravchuk became head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda in 1980, focusing on agitprop.[9]

Kravchuk's activities as a member of the Communist Party were, from the outset, primarily involved in the spread of ideological propaganda, particularly what the party referred to as "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism".[17] He celebrated the establishment of what he referred to as "political discotheques" in 1984 and advocated for greater amounts of books, films and works of theatre which negatively depicted imperialism and capitalism, in what Motyl described as an "unabashedly Brezhnevite" taste in media.[9] In 1982, he advised the Central Committee to fight the Catholic Church's ostpolitik by destroying symbols associated with the banned Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, arresting its adherents and investigating churches, cemeteries and sermons for elements perceived as pro-Catholic.[17]

Metamorphosis (1989–1991)

[edit]

As what would become the 1989–1991 Ukrainian revolution was in its early stages, Kravchuk was present at the First Convention of the People's Movement of Ukraine [uk] in September 1989. Adrian Karatnycky, a human rights activist who had been present at the convention, later remarked on "the anomaly" of Kravchuk's presence at the gathering, given its association with the Soviet dissidents.[18] A month later, following the removal of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky from the position of First Secretary, Kravchuk was appointed to the secretariat within the Central Committee on 18 October 1989 and promoted to a candidate member of the Politburo. He would later be promoted to a full member of the Politburo and Second Secretary of the party in June 1990, followed by membership in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in July of the same year.[19]

Kravchuk in 1990 as Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada

Between 1989 and 1991, Kravchuk underwent a significant ideological shift, in what has been described as a "metamorphosis" by Motyl and journalist Serge Schmemann.[9][20] During this time, Kravchuk transitioned from a hardline propagandist against Ukrainian nationalism to a supporter of Ukrainian nationalism and one of Ukraine's leading statesmen.[9] Kravchuk later stated that he had become anti-Soviet while studying at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU [bg], when he discovered documents revealing the existence of the Holodomor.[17]

In 1988, Kravchuk began supporting Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of perestroika. Following Gorbachev's statements, Kravchuk called upon the party to "democratise its own agitation and propaganda" and advocated for communists to "learn democracy", as well as the decentralisation of power to the republics.[21] Throughout 1989 and the summer of 1990, Kravchuk increasingly moved towards national communism, deliberately imitating previous Ukrainian national communists from the interwar period and 1960s.[22] In March of that year, he stood in the 1990 Ukrainian Supreme Soviet election for the city of Yampil, Vinnytsia Oblast. He was elected in a landslide, winning 87.38% of the vote and defeating three other candidates in the first round of voting.[23]

As a result of the election, the anti-communist Democratic Bloc captured 111 of 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet or parliament). 92 Communist People's Deputies left the party in July of the same year to become independents associated with the Democratic Bloc, leaving the weakened Communist majority to call itself the Group of 239.[24] The Democratic Bloc possessed disproportionate influence compared to its number of deputies; of the 190 deputies who were regularly active in committees, over half were from the democratic opposition; only six of the parliamentary presidium's 25 members were conservative members of the CPU; many of the Communist deputies were also directors of state-owned enterprises and therefore unwilling or unable to devote energy to the Verkhovna Rada; and most of the remaining communists were used to treating the Rada as a rubber-stamp and unfamiliar with working under a popularly-elected and powerful parliament.[25]

First Secretary Vladimir Ivashko left Ukraine to take up a position in Moscow in July 1990, a month after being appointed to the position of Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. Motyl notes the perplexing nature of Ivashko's decision; the People's Movement of Ukraine (Ukrainian: Народний рух України, romanised: Narodnyi rukh Ukrainy; abbreviated Rukh) was gaining strength, Lithuania had declared independence from the Soviet Union and Russia had declared itself sovereign, meaning that Russian laws took precedence over their Soviet equivalents in case of conflict. Ukraine's politicians were left so incensed by Ivashko's perceived abandonment of Ukraine that the CPU voted in favour of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine on 16 July.[26]

1991 Soviet stamp commemorating the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine

With Ivashko's absence, both the office of First Secretary and the chairmanship of the Rada were left unfilled, as he had held both roles. Kravchuk was appointed as Chairman of the Rada while conservative Stanislav Hurenko was appointed as First Secretary of the party. This partition between national communism and conservative, "imperial" communism (as termed by researchers Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio) allowed for members of the CPU to choose which faction they favoured at a time when interest in activism was rising and fear of the state was decreasing. In spite of their differences, by the time Kravchuk and Hurenko were appointed their positions they both loathed Gorbachev; Hurenko saw him as responsible for the impending collapse of the Soviet system, while Kravchuk viewed him as attempting to maintain the Soviet Union as a singular state. Kravchuk was given increased powers shortly after his appointment, as Gorbachev abolished the leading role of the party in favour of granting formal authority to the Supreme Soviets. This abolition of the leading role of the party further weakened the already-demoralised CPU, allowing for Kravchuk to shepherd through support for the Declaration of State Sovereignty.[22]

By winter 1990–spring 1991, a formidable faction of national communists had emerged, led by Kravchuk.[27] Nonetheless, Kravchuk continued to adjust his ideology as he felt necessary. He did not fully embrace Ukrainian nationalism in this time period and shifted towards conservatism in the winter of 1990–1991, during which the conservative communists were believed to be on the rise prior to the January Events. Eventually, by the spring of 1991, he had coopted the language and iconography of Rukh. At this point, Hurenko complained to the party that he "belonged only nominally to the party", an assessment shared by historian Andrew Wilson.[28]

The 1991 Soviet Union referendum marked the sole success of the conservative communists in Ukraine prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With a turnout of 83%, 70.5% of voters in Ukraine expressed support for the referendum's question to "preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedom of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?" In the western Ukrainian region of Galicia, however, 88% of voters supported Ukraine's complete independence from the Soviet Union. Kravchuk also inserted the question of whether Ukraine should become "a part of the Union of Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine", which 80.2% of voters voted in favour of. Wilson notes that there was significant confusion over the meaning of the word 'sovereignty', which had been used in Soviet political discourse in reference to Ukraine since 1921, as a majority of people voted for both the preservation of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian sovereignty.[29]

In the months prior to the Soviet Union's dissolution, Kravchuk deliberately contrasted Gorbachev's stated "9+1" formula (including republics willing to remain members of the Soviet Union alongside a governing centre) by calling for a "9+0" solution, in which there would be no centre, or simply "+0", indicating his willingness to support Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union if necessary. For the most part, between March and August 1991 Kravchuk continued to advocate for sovereignty, which was "the limit of most political imaginations", per Wilson.[30]

August coup and embrace of Ukrainian nationalism

[edit]
General Valentin Varennikov, leader of the State Committee on the State of Emergency in Kyiv

Conservative communists opposed to Gorbachev's policy attempted a coup d'état on 19 August 1991. Valentin Varennikov, an Army General, was dispatched by the State Committee on the State of Emergency junta to Kyiv as an "emissary", where he began pressuring Kravchuk to throw his lot in with the coup.[31] Kravchuk was awoken at 6:30 on 19 August by General Viktor Chechevatov, commander of the Kyiv Military District, who first informed him of the coup. At 9:00, Kravchuk and Hurenko travelled to the Verkhovna Rada building and met Varennikov, who threatened to respond to any resistance by bringing the state of emergency in Moscow to Ukraine. Kravchuk had refused to meet Varennikov at 11 Bankova Street (the headquarters of the Central Committee), saying that power rested with the Rada and not the Central Committee.[32]

Kravchuk refused to support or condemn the attempted coup while it was ongoing,[19] Varennikov recalled in his memoirs that Kravchuk, while evasive on Varennikov's suggestions to declare a state of emergency in Galicia, was largely cooperative with the putschists.[31] During the attempted takeover, a pro-coup "committee", led by Deputy Prime Minister Kostyantyn Masyk and Ukrainian KGB chief Yevhen Marchuk, formed with the intention of fulfilling the junta's orders. Opposition parties prepared to go underground.[31] Rukh, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party all calling for a general strike, with Rukh's call for a strike being published in the Evening Kyiv daily newspaper. The Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine took a more measured approach, advocating for people to remain calm and not engage in "provocations". Rukh's "people's guard", a group of volunteers that had defended the organisation's demonstrations, began creating plans to seize control of postal, telephone and government buildings, with a blockade on roads, airports and train stations.[33]

Kravchuk first delivered a televised address at 16:00, stressing that he neither condoned nor condemned the coup. That evening, he said on Soviet evening television that "what has happened was bound to happen", a statement that caused significant controversy. Kravchuk later renounced his evening television remarks, claiming that he had been "censored". Ihor Yukhnovskyi, Les Tanyuk, Oleksandr Yemets, Dmytro Pavlychko and Volodymyr Yavorivsky, leading members of the Democratic Bloc, met with Kravchuk from 18:00–20:00. Kravchuk refused their demands to dissolve the condemn the coup and call an emergency session of the Verkhovna Rada.[33]

The coup attempt ended with the junta standing down on 21 August. Kravchuk's official biography claimed he left the CPU on 19 August,[19] though the archives of the party show that he was present at the final meeting of the Politburo on 22 August. It is unclear why he was present at the Politburo's meeting.[34] Following the coup's failure, the Verkhovna Rada voted to ban the party as a criminal organisation for its support of the junta.[35] It is unclear what Kravchuk planned to do if the putsch succeeded; both Wilson and Motyl argue that it was impossible for Kravchuk to become completely loyal to the putschists; Wilson reasons that Kravchuk would likely wait for the junta to weaken before returning to advocating sovereignty,[36] while Motyl describes it as "implausible to argue" that Kravchuk could have supported the junta on the basis that, at the least, it would lead to the end of the powers and prestige he had accumulated since 1990.[37]

Following the Act of Declaration of Independence Kravchuk was vested with presidential powers, thus becoming both de facto and de jure head of state. Later that year, on 5 December 1991, voters formally elected him president in Ukraine's first presidential election. Just a few days before on 1 December, the voters voted overwhelmingly to secede from the Soviet Union—a move which Kravchuk now fully supported. This made Kravchuk the first head of state of independent Ukraine.[38]

Presidency

[edit]

Kravchuk was inaugurated as Ukraine's president on 5 December 1991 in a ceremony conducted by the Verkhovna Rada. At the same event, the 1922 Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was renounced by the Rada. The event had heavy symbolism in Ukraine, and, according to D'Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, was regarded by some as a renunciation of the 1654 Pereiaslav Agreement, which had led to the incorporation of the Cossack Hetmanate into the Russian Empire. Kravchuk, recognising the gravity of the ceremony, said, "The empire which endured for 337 years no longer exists, and Ukraine is the author of its destruction."[39]

Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk and Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed the Belavezha Accords, dissolving the Soviet Union, 8 December 1991

Kravchuk's primary support base as President was an informal coalition of national communists and moderate national democrats, who emerged out of the Ukrainian Soviet dissident movement. Kuzio describes Kravchuk's circle in this time as a "party of power" and notes that he deliberately avoided declaring a political party or movement. According to Kuzio, Kravchuk's reticence in formalising his movement was based on both a desire to avoid negative attention from anti-communists and the general unpopularity of political parties in Ukraine.[40] As part of what Robert Kravchuk refers to as a "Faustian bargain", the national democrats, chiefly Rukh, supported Kravchuk and his formerly-communist nomenklatura allies in their nation-building policies in return for an impromptu agreement against political and economic reforms.[41]

Kravchuk was strongly opposed to Viacheslav Chornovil's proposals for federalism, an attitude which Kuzio credits as being shaped by the defeat of Ukrainian forces in the War of Independence.[42] He introduced a system of "presidential representatives" (Ukrainian: представники, romanised: predstavnyky) at the oblast and local levels, similar to the French prefect system.[19] The presidential representatives, legalised with the support of the SPU, New Ukraine and most national democrats (including the opposition Rukh party), were given broad powers, including implementation of local budgets, acts of the central government and suspension of local officeholders.[43] Bohdan Harasymiw of the University of Alberta blames Kravchuk's presidential representative system for weakening grassroots democracy.[19]

Economy

[edit]

Popular support for Ukrainian independence had been largely motivated by dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the Soviet government.[44][45] According to Wilson, there was widespread belief among Ukrainians that Soviet rule had brought about net outflows of income resulting from over-taxation, under-investment and underpricing of goods produced in Ukraine (particularly agricultural products, iron, steel and coal). Both the nomenklatura and the general population had positive expectations for the economy coming out of independence; for the latter, it meant that the perceived inequalities in the Soviet system (which had been driving the 1989–1991 revolution from its outset) could finally be brought down, while the former saw it as a chance to use wealth accumulated under the Soviet era to establish control over Ukraine's businesses, particularly industrial enterprises and banks.[45]

During Kravchuk's presidency, there was general agreement among Ukraine's politicians that while economic reforms were necessary, neoliberal shock therapy policies, as in Russia, were undesirable. Kravchuk was left uncertain of how to deal with the economy; he openly stated in January 1993 that if he knew what to do, he would have told the country's government and economic managers to do it.[46] Robert Kravchuk describes Kravchuk's rule as a time in which economic reforms were "effectively postponed", noting that he focused on nation-building. His presidency was marked, according to R. Kravchuk, by "massive emissions of cheap credit and budget subsidies to industry, paired with the imposition of administrative controls over prices and exchange rates". These policies unsuccessfully sought to reduce inflationary pressures, and R. Kravchuk notes that Kravchuk appeared to see increased liquidity of enterprises as a means for reducing inflation by increasing productivity — according to R. Kravchuk, Kravchuk viewed inflation as being caused by a lack of goods compared to the money supply.[47]

A lack of economic reforms was implicitly accepted as part of the de facto coalition between the national communists and national democrats. Kravchuk granted powerful economic positions to nomenklatura elites, especially those from eastern Ukraine, during his presidency, something economist Volodymyr Zviglyanich criticised as leading to the retrenchment of the Soviet-era elite under Kravchuk's leadership. Industrial restructuring and liberalisation of prices and trade did not occur, nor did reductions of loans and financial aid to state-owned enterprises and farms.[48] Low levels of state control led to rampant corruption, including buying raw materials sold between post-Soviet states at below-market prices before selling them to the West or obtaining government-backed loans.[46]

Ukraine under Kravchuk's presidency fell into economic depression from 1992; the country's gross domestic product dropped by 9.9% in 1992, 14.2% in 1993 and 23% in 1994, ultimately standing at half of 1992 levels by 1995. Inflation reached a peak of 5000% in 1993, erasing the population's savings and reducing the purchasing power of wages, pensions and all other sources of income. Similar economic declines were found across other post-Soviet states, with researcher Verena Fritz writing in 2007 that the "best-performing" states had lost 20–35% of their GDPs in the early 1990s as a result of the Soviet Union's dissolution.[49] Business networks that emerged in eastern Ukraine the 1970s (such as the Dnipropetrovsk Mafia and the Donetsk Clan) became greatly enriched as a result of Ukrainian independence, obtaining their money through both illegal and semi-legal means using wealth which either had been accumulated under the Soviet Union or was invested by high-ranking individuals in communist organisations (particularly the Komsomol and CPU). The Ukrainian state's weak organisation at the time allowed these business and organised crime networks to gather economic assets. Kravchuk was politically connected to these networks, and their members became the Ukrainian oligarchs later in the 1990s.[50]

Foreign policy

[edit]

As part of the agreement between the national communists and national-democrats, the latter group largely dictated foreign policy during Kravchuk's presidency. Dmytro Pavlychko, Bohdan Horyn and Serhiy Holovatyi, all influential People's Deputies on the Foreign Affairs Committee, were longtime dissident activists who belonged to Rukh and the pro-Kravchuk Republican and Democratic parties. This policy came to an end following the 1994 parliamentary election, when Communist Borys Oliynyk became head of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Socialist Volodymyr Mukhin [uk] the Defence and Security Committee.[51] Kravchuk took a pro-European stance, developing relations with the West and signing a cooperation accord with the European Union.[5] He opposed membership in the EU, Council of Europe and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[52]

Kravchuk welcomed the idea of NATO enlargement. As president, he never opposed the expansion of the alliance or the possibility of a future Ukrainian membership to NATO. This was reflected in his disdain for military cooperation with Eurasian structures, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, in favour of European security structures. He said that "the best guarantee to Ukraine's security would be membership to NATO." He expressed support for an immediate Ukrainian membership to NATO in 1994.[53]

Russia and denuclearisation

[edit]

Kravchuk found common ground with the national democrats in Ukraine's foreign policy being a counterweight to Russian influence in the post-Soviet sphere; Russia's political establishment was hostile to Ukrainian independence, and politicians in Russia stoked anti-Ukrainian sentiment by claiming that Ukrainian independence would be short-lived before it became part of Russia. The primary disputes between Russia and Ukraine under Kravchuk were the status of Ukraine's post-Soviet nuclear arsenal, which Russia demanded they hand over; the Black Sea Fleet — Russia and Ukraine both sought all or part of it; and the city of Sevastopol, located in the Crimean peninsula, which Russia claimed as its own. Kravchuk's government refused to support efforts to transform the Commonwealth of Independent States into a supranational legal entity or an instrument for post-Soviet integration, refusing to sign the CIS collective defence treaty or ratify the CIS Charter.[54]

Ukrainian and US officials at a UR-100N ICBM silo in Pervomaisk, 1994

Negotiations over the nuclear arsenal would prove to be the most consequential point of Kravchuk's presidency.[55] From its independence to late 1994, the United States and Russia sought to isolate Ukraine, with the US viewing Ukraine as a rogue state for refusing to surrender its post-Soviet nuclear arsenal. Ukraine, in contrast, viewed Russian refusal to accept Ukrainian independence as permanent with alarm and viewed nuclear weapons as a way to obtain security guarantees from the US. At the height of tensions over denuclearisation, Russia cut off its supply of natural gas to Ukraine in an effort to force Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal and control of Sevastopol Naval Base. Kravchuk initially acceded to Russian demands, but later backtracked after an overwhelmingly-negative response from the Ukrainian public. In January 1994 a deal was reached, as part of which Ukraine would surrender its nuclear arsenal in return for American and Russian recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and Ukraine being allowed into the Partnership for Peace.[56] This was followed by the Budapest Memorandum, signed on 5 December 1994 at the Budapest summit of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. As part of the memorandum, Ukraine committed to giving up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees.[38]

Kravchuk's foreign policy towards Russia, as well as Russian opposition to Ukraine's existence as an independent state, ultimately would play a part in his 1994 electoral defeat, as a significant portion of the population of eastern and southern Ukraine favoured closer relations with Russia. Leonid Kuchma advocated for such ties in the 1994 presidential election, playing a role in his eventual victory. The anti-Ukrainian rhetoric espoused by Russian politicians also consolidated Ukrainian independence, according to University of Cologne professor Gerhard Simon.[57]

Balkans, Romania and Moldova

[edit]

Ukraine under Kravchuk was one of the first countries to recognise Croatia and Slovenia as independent states; it was the third country (after Slovenia and Lithuania) to recognise Croatian independence and the first United Nations member state at the time to do so. Kravchuk had maintained positive relations with Croatian president Franjo Tuđman since May 1991, when he received him as part of an official visit prior to both countries becoming independent.[58] Kravchuk additionally saw parallels between the Croatian War of Independence and a potential Russia–Ukraine war, and further sought to harmonise Ukrainian foreign policy with that of western European states as part of his broader efforts to demonstrate Ukraine's solidarity with the West and Ukraine's publicly-stated ambition to be treated as a European country.[59] The Verkhovna Rada sent 1,200 peacekeepers to Yugoslavia as part of the United Nations Protection Force by 1993, in what was viewed by the government as both a method of increasing Ukraine's international prestige and providing training for its soldiers. Kravchuk's government opposed Operation Deny Flight and Kravchuk himself endorsed a Russian call for debate at the United Nations Security Council, viewing the UNSC as the only body capable of authorising a NATO military response.[60]

Transnistrian separatist forces during the Transnistrian War. At various points in his presidency, Kravchuk supported either Moldova and Transnistria.

Romania–Ukraine relations were tense from Ukraine's independence. The post-revolution government of Romania initially refused to recognise the border established following the 1940 Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, with the Parliament of Romania publicly declaring the results of the independence referendum to be "null and void" in parts of Ukraine which had been Romanian before 1940.[61] No Romanian government followed up on the 1991 declaration by the parliament.[62] Romania was one of two neighbouring countries (alongside Russia) which refused to sign an agreement with Ukraine on inviolability of borders. In retaliation, Ukraine cited the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties, which recognised the 1940 border. Romania, in return, cited the Paris Peace Treaties as justification for its claim to Snake Island, which prompted further disputes over the Romania–Ukraine border regarding the legitimacy of the unratified 1948 treaty that transferred Snake Island to Soviet Ukraine. The border dispute between the two countries was ultimately resolved in 1997, when Romania and Ukraine signed the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness, followed by the 2003 Treaty on the Status of the Romanian–Ukrainian State Border, as prerequisites for Romanian membership in NATO and the EU.[63]

Kravchuk's position on the status of Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict varied throughout his presidency, with Pål Kolstø at the University of Oslo and Andrei Edemsky and Natalya Kalashnikova from the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies in Moscow comparing it to the movement of a pendulum. In the spring of 1992, while Russo-Ukrainian tensions were at a height over the Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine established a 50-kilometre security zone along its border with the self-proclaimed state of Transnistria with the intention of intercepting Cossack volunteers crossing into Moldova from Ukrainian territory. Ukraine further protested Russian plans to place the 14th Guards Combined Arms Army in Transnistria as a peacekeeping force and advocated for Romania to be permitted to attend negotiations. Later in the spring, during negotiations, Ukraine expressed support for the Transnistrian government to be included in talks, matching Russia's position. As the conflict in Transnistria escalated, Ukraine moved away from the Russian position, with deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk stating that Moldova should remain united with a Transnistrian autonomous region and that Transnistrian representatives should participate in negotiations as members of the Moldovan delegation. The next day, following a discussion with Yeltsin in Dagomys, Kravchuk again moved to a pro-Russian position.[64]

Kravchuk's approach to Transnistria was criticised by the national-democratic opposition and in Transnistrian media for opposite reasons; Rukh accused Kravchuk and the Verkhovna Rada of supporting "Russian aggression against Moldova", and according to Eduard Baidaus of Red Deer College, some Ukrainian authors linked Russia's intervention in Transnistria to their support for separatism in the Donbas and Crimea. Conversely, Transnistrian media castigated Kravchuk for his refusal to directly intervene in Moldova, portraying him as a traitor to the Ukrainian people.[65][c]

Central Europe

[edit]

Poland was the first country to recognise Ukraine's independence, doing so on 2 December 1991. Hungary followed by being the first country to establish an embassy in Ukraine, doing so by upgrading its consulate in Kyiv to an embassy.[68]

Kravchuk's foreign policy towards the countries of Central Europe was informed by the belief that Ukraine had an identity which was fundamentally Central European in nature. As evidence of this viewpoint, Ukrainian officials cited several factors, including Ukraine's geographical location in the centre of Europe, dynastic ties between the Kievan Rus' and the medieval dynasties of other European states, the presence of the Danube on Ukrainian territory, and a relationship between Poles and Ukrainians dating back centuries (as stated by Zlenko). Kravchuk unsuccessfully advocated for Ukraine to be admitted to the Visegrád Triangle, saying to the press at a May 1992 meeting with Polish president Lech Wałęsa that "a triangle is an excellent geometrical figure, but a quadrilateral is an even better one". In spite of Polish sympathies to Ukraine's claim to a status as a Central European state, it was eventually decided by all three members of the Viségrad Triangle (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia) that adding Ukraine, a post-Soviet state which had undertaken no meaningful economic reforms, would ultimately harm their chances of joining NATO and the European Economic Community and antagonise Russia by creating an image of Central European states impeding on what the former regarded as its sphere of influence.[69]

Military policy, Black Sea Fleet dispute

[edit]
See also: Black Sea Fleet dispute
Ships docked at Sevastopol Naval Base, 2004. Sevastopol and its naval base, as well as the Black Sea Fleet that was based there, were at the centre of a dispute between Ukraine and Russia throughout Kravchuk's presidency.

Kravchuk advocated for significant attention to be given to the formation of an independent Armed Forces of Ukraine, citing the failure of the Ukrainian War of Independence in 1917.[42] Following the failure of the 1991 coup attempt, Kravchuk lent his support to Kostyantyn Morozov, a military commander who was active in advocacy for a separate Ukrainian military and had established the groundwork for such a body in the autumn of 1991. In doing so, Kravchuk was joined by the national democrats and nationalists, who supported building a military out of the existing Soviet military in Ukraine. Shaken by the coup attempt, neither the Soviet military apparatus in Moscow nor conservative communists were unable to mount meaningful resistance to the plan, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine were established soon after the December 1991 referendum confirmed Ukrainian independence.[70]

Kravchuk refused to retain the common armed forces and currency inside the Commonwealth of Independent States.[71][page needed]

The Black Sea Fleet, based in Crimea, soon became a sticking point in Ukraine's efforts to bring Soviet Army units within its borders under its command and a source of dispute between Ukraine and Russia. The reasons for this are disputed; John Jaworsky of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute wrote in 1996 that Ukrainian political leadership's inability and unwillingness to assert control over the BSF had allowed Russia to claim it,[70] while Tyler Felgenhauer of Princeton University wrote in February 1999 that the dispute began when both the Ukrainian and Russian sides made maximalist claims on the fleet. Morozov and Minister of the Defence Industry and Conversion Viktor Antonov [uk] stated in a January 1992 press conference that the BSF would remain Ukrainian and that Ukraine was only willing to surrender ships carrying nuclear weapons, which were to be transferred to the CIS. Russia claimed ownership of the entire fleet, as well as the Crimean city of Sevastopol, which was controlled by Ukraine.[72]

In April 1992, the BSF dispute reached the brink of conflict. Kravchuk declared that month that a Ukrainian Navy would be established, based in Crimea. Yeltsin, in response, ordered the BSF to raise Saint Andrew's Flag, the recently-inaugurated ensign of the Russian Navy. The BSF's commanders deployed military police with armoured personnel carriers on Sevastopol's streets in response to rumours that Ukrainian nationalist militias were coming from Kyiv to take over the fleet, and a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation was subsequently dispatched to Crimea to demand that the BSF stand down. Dmytro Pavlychko, a member of the delegation, described Yeltsin's issuance of orders to the BSF as tantamount to a declaration of war. The situation was eventually defused when Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed by phone to retreat from their previous claims over the entire BSF and establish a joint commission on the status of the BSF.[73]

Downfall

[edit]
Leonid Kuchma (pictured here in 1995) defeated Kravchuk in the 1994 Ukrainian presidential election. He previously served as Kravchuk's prime minister.

Independent trade unions of coal miners in the eastern Donbas region began striking on 2 September 1992, in protest of Kravchuk's refusal to guarantee that they would be granted workers' benefits and compensation. These strikes were joined by transport workers in February 1993.[74]

In a bid to stem the strikes, Kravchuk dissolved the Verkhovna Rada on 17 June 1993 and called snap parliamentary and presidential elections for the next year. While observers had expected low turnout and apathy, 75% of Ukrainians turned up to vote. The result demonstrated an emerging ideological clash between eastern Ukraine and Crimea, where the refounded Communist Party of Ukraine was strong, and central and western Ukraine, where the moderate national-democratic Rukh performed well. The New York Times quoted Volodymyr Lanovyi, an economist who had been fired by Kravchuk for advocating for market reforms, as saying "Although we do not have final results, it is clear that Kravchuk is the loser. The big turnout is a big moral blow to him." Kravchuk's former prime minister Leonid Kuchma, who had announced his candidacy in the presidential election, won 91% of the vote in his district. Ivan Plyushch, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and another rival of Kravchuk, also won his seat by a majority of votes, as did Chornovil, who was expected to again face off against Kravchuk in the presidential election.[75]

Following the first round of the parliamentary election, Kravchuk called for the presidential election, scheduled for June 1994, to be cancelled in a 25 March address and that he required emergency powers from the Rada to undertake economic reforms and fight organised crime. 120 primarily national-democratic deputies supported Kravchuk's call for greater powers; Rukh reluctantly endorsed his demand to postpone the elections, arguing that to do so without reforming electoral laws would cause a political crisis. The Communist Party soon took control of the Rada's leadership and blocked efforts to postpone or cancel the presidential election.[75]

Kravchuk ran for a second term as president in 1994 but was defeated by Kuchma, with his loss being attributed to the rampant graft and the declining economy.[38][76]

Post-presidency

[edit]

Soon after his defeat in 1994, Kravchuk joined the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU(o)). He served as a member of the Verkhovna Rada from 1994 until the 2006 Ukrainian parliamentary election.[77][78]

In February 2003, Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, accused Kravchuk and other 300 public high-ranked officials of being members of the Freemasons.[79]

During the 2004 presidential elections Kravchuk actively supported the candidacy of Viktor Yanukovych,[80] and was a member of the Yanukovych team that negotiated with the opposition in the aftermath of that disputed election. In November 2004 he told the media that he was afraid that the resulting crisis would cause the disintegration of the country, intensifying movements for certain regions of Ukraine to join other countries.[81]

On 25 September 2009, Kravchuk declared during an interview with the newspaper Den that he left SDPU(o) and became unaffiliated again. He explained this based on the fact that his former party decided to join the Bloc of Left and Center-left Forces to run for the 2010 presidential elections. He was indignant due to the fact that the political council of the party decided to accomplish that behind the closed doors in non-democratic order. He called it [the] "block as the artificial union without any perspectives".[82][83] Kravchuk endorsed Yuliya Tymoshenko during the 2010 presidential elections campaign.[84]

During the 2010 election campaign, he accused incumbent president Viktor Yushchenko of having "turned into Yanukovych's aide. He has actually turned into an also-ran. His task is to slander Yuliya Tymoshenko every day and prevent her from winning [the presidential elections]".[85] Kravchuk explained his shift in support from Yanukovych to Tymoshenko was caused because he felt Yanukovych "turned his back" on all the issues Kravchuk wanted him to address as president: the Ukrainian language, culture and the Holodomor. "Only the dead or the stupid do not change their views", he stated in December 2009 when he also voiced the opinion that voting for Yanukovych in the second round of the 2010 elections would indicate an anti-Ukrainian position.[86]

Kravchuk in Poland in June 2013.

In July 2020, Kravchuk was chosen to represent Ukraine at the Trilateral Contact Group (formed to facilitate a diplomatic resolution to the war in Donbas), being appointed to replace Leonid Kuchma.[87][88] He maintained this position until February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.[78][89]

Death and funeral

[edit]

Kravchuk had heart surgery in June 2021. He was reportedly in ill health by this time. On 29 June 2021, he missed the solemn meeting of the Verkhovna Rada on the occasion of Constitution Day due to heart surgery. After surgery, Kravchuk was placed in intensive care and connected to a ventilator. In July, the media reported that Kravchuk had been in intensive care for a month.

On 10 May 2022, a family member told the Ukrainian News Agency that Kravchuk had died at the age of 88, after a long illness.[77] His death was also confirmed by unnamed officials in Kyiv, as well as Andriy Yermak, head of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy's office.[90] He died a week after Belarus's Stanislav Shushkevich, another signatory to the Belovezh Accords, died in Minsk. On 11 May, President Zelenskyy issued a decree establishing the Kravchuk Prize in his memory.

His funeral ceremony took place on 17 May at the Ukrainian House in Kyiv, and was attended by President Zelenskyy and First Lady Olena Zelenska as well as three former presidents of Ukraine: Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko. In addition, guests included his wife Antonina, Mayor Vitali Klitschko of Kyiv, Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov and former politicians Oleksandr Kuzmuk, Oleksandr Moroz and Mustafa Dzhemilev. He was buried at Baikove Cemetery.[91]

Personal life

[edit]

Kravchuk married Antonina Mykhailivna Mishura in 1957.[13][12] She rarely attended official events with her husband.[12]

Kravchuk and his wife had one child, Oleksandr Leonidovych Kravchuk (born 1959), president of the State Company "Nafkom-Ahro" and the former FC Nafkom Brovary. Kravchuk had two grandchildren and one great-granddaughter. After Kravchuk stopped working for the Ukrainian state, he lived in a state-owned dacha in Koncha-Zaspa.[92]

Legacy

[edit]

He is often associated as a key figure in achieving Ukraine's independence and in giving up Ukraine's nuclear arsenal.[4][89][90]

Former Belarusian leader, Stanislav Shushkevich, who took part in the Belovezha talks and signed the deal, said; "Kravchuk was focused on Ukraine's independence, he was proud that Ukraine declared its independence in a referendum and he was elected president on 1 December 1991." Following his death, Ukrainian minister of defense, Oleksii Reznikov, said, "Thank you for the peaceful renewal of our Independence. We're defending it now with weapons in our hands." Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Yermak, said it was "Sad news and a great loss," describing Kravchuk as "a wise patriot of Ukraine, a truly historical figure in gaining our independence."[5] Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid tribute to Kravchuk, calling him not just a historical figure but "a man who knew how to find wise words and to say them so that all Ukrainians would hear them."[90]

Awards and honors

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Authority transferred on 22 August 1992.
  2. ^ In this name that follows East Slavic naming customs, the patronymic is Makarovych and the family name is Kravchuk.
  3. ^ Other than Ukraine, Moldova is the only other former republic of the Soviet Union where Ukrainians are a larger number of the population than Russians, and Transnistria was part of the Ukrainian SSR prior to 1940.[66] During the Transnistrian War, Transnistrian forces used the image of poet and national symbol Taras Shevchenko and the concept of the "people's Ukraine" in wartime propaganda.[67]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ "People's Deputy of Ukraine of the II convocation". Verkhovna Rada (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 22 December 2014.
  2. ^ "People's Deputy of Ukraine of the III convocation". Verkhovna Rada (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 22 December 2014.
  3. ^ "People's Deputy of Ukraine of the VI convocation". Verkhovna Rada (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 4 January 2017. Retrieved 22 December 2014.
  4. ^ a b Reuters 2022.
  5. ^ a b c d e Steele 2022.
  6. ^ Karatnycky 2024, p. 12.
  7. ^ Volyn 2018.
  8. ^ Motyl 1995, pp. 110–111.
  9. ^ a b c d e Motyl 1995, p. 108.
  10. ^ Hall 2022.
  11. ^ Musafirova 2013.
  12. ^ a b c First ladies of Ukraine, ITAR-TASS (6 June 2014).[permanent dead link]
  13. ^ a b c Bush 2010, p. 428.
  14. ^ LB.ua 2022.
  15. ^ Patil 2022.
  16. ^ Kovalenko 2012.
  17. ^ a b c Kotubei-Herutska 2023.
  18. ^ Karatnycky 2024, p. 3.
  19. ^ a b c d e Harasymiw 2020.
  20. ^ Schmemann 1991.
  21. ^ Motyl 1995, pp. 108–109.
  22. ^ a b D'Anieri, Kravchuk & Kuzio 1999, p. 24.
  23. ^ 1st Verkhovna Rada.
  24. ^ Karatnycky 2024, pp. 4–5.
  25. ^ D'Anieri, Kravchuk & Kuzio 1999, pp. 23–24.
  26. ^ Motyl 1995, p. 109.
  27. ^ Kuzio 2000, p. 54.
  28. ^ Wilson 2022, p. 163.
  29. ^ Wilson 2022, pp. 164–165.
  30. ^ Wilson 2022, p. 165.
  31. ^ a b c Wilson 2022, p. 166.
  32. ^ Kuzio 2000, p. 181.
  33. ^ a b Kuzio 2000, p. 182.
  34. ^ Wilson 2022, pp. 166–167.
  35. ^ Karatnycky 2024, p. 8.
  36. ^ Wilson 2022, p. 167.
  37. ^ Motyl 1995, p. 110.
  38. ^ a b c Wesolowsky 2022.
  39. ^ D'Anieri, Kravchuk & Kuzio 1999, p. 31.
  40. ^ Kuzio 1994, pp. 116, 119.
  41. ^ Kravchuk 2002, p. 37.
  42. ^ a b Kuzio 1994, p. 119.
  43. ^ Wolczuk 2013, pp. 112–113.
  44. ^ Kravchuk 2002, p. 2.
  45. ^ a b Fritz 2007, p. 112.
  46. ^ a b Fritz 2007, p. 114.
  47. ^ Kravchuk 2002, pp. 38–39.
  48. ^ Kravchuk 2002, pp. 37–38.
  49. ^ Fritz 2007, p. 113.
  50. ^ Fritz 2007, pp. 120–121.
  51. ^ Kuzio 1997, pp. 589–591.
  52. ^ Kravchuk 2002, p. 39.
  53. ^ Tür 2000, pp. 27–28.
  54. ^ Simon 2002, pp. 1–2.
  55. ^ Goncharenko 2022.
  56. ^ D'Anieri 2012, p. 448.
  57. ^ Simon 2002, p. 2.
  58. ^ Kuzio 1997, p. 587.
  59. ^ Kuzio 1997, pp. 590.
  60. ^ Kuzio 1997, pp. 592–593.
  61. ^ Blaj 2013, pp. 170–171.
  62. ^ Kolstø, Edemsky & Kalashnikova 1993, p. 991.
  63. ^ Blaj 2013, pp. 170–172.
  64. ^ Kolstø, Edemsky & Kalashnikova 1993, pp. 991–992.
  65. ^ Baidaus 2018, pp. 507, 513.
  66. ^ Kuzio 1995, p. 19.
  67. ^ Baidaus 2018, p. 514.
  68. ^ Blaj 2013, p. 170.
  69. ^ Burant 1995, pp. 1127–1128.
  70. ^ a b Jaworsky 1996, p. 226.
  71. ^ Donaldson, Robert H. (2005). The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 978-0-7656-2741-4.
  72. ^ Felgenhauer 1999, p. 4–5.
  73. ^ Felgenhauer 1999, p. 5.
  74. ^ Crowley 1995, pp. 54–55.
  75. ^ a b Erlanger 1994.
  76. ^ Dickinson 2022.
  77. ^ a b Herasimova 2022.
  78. ^ a b Sloboden Pečat 2022.
  79. ^ Lubensky 2003.
  80. ^ Chyvokunya 2007.
  81. ^ Radio Ukraine 2004.
  82. ^ 5 Kanal 2009.
  83. ^ Interfax-Ukraine 2009.
  84. ^ Focus 2009.
  85. ^ Interfax-Ukraine (27 October 2009).[full citation needed]
  86. ^ ZIK 2009.
  87. ^ RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service 2020.
  88. ^ Socor 2020.
  89. ^ a b TVP World 2022.
  90. ^ a b c Associated Press 2022.
  91. ^ president.gov.ua 2022.
  92. ^ Tuchynska 2010.
  93. ^ "Про присвоєння звання Герой України". zakon.rada.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  94. ^ "УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №277/2020". president.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  95. ^ "Указ Президента України № 4/2007 від 9 січня 2007 року «Про нагородження Л. Кравчука орденом князя Ярослава Мудрого»". zakon.rada.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  96. ^ "Указ Президента України № 11/2004 від 10 січня 2004 року «Про нагородження Л. Кравчука орденом князя Ярослава Мудрого»". zakon.rada.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  97. ^ "Указ Президента України № 6/99 від 10 січня 1999 року «Про нагородження відзнакою Президента України "Орден князя Ярослава Мудрого"»". zakon.rada.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  98. ^ "Указ Президента України № 731/96 від 21 серпня 1996 року «Про нагородження відзнакою Президента України "Орден князя Ярослава Мудрого"»". zakon.rada.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  99. ^ "О награждении Л. Кравчука орденом Свободы". search.ligazakon.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  100. ^ "УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №336/2016". president.gov.ua. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  101. ^ "Ольга Сумская актриса года, а Александр Жеребко молодой деятель искусств — премия «Celebrity Awards 2020»". hronika.info. 21 September 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  102. ^ "Биография". leonid-kravchuk.com.ua. Archived from the original on 12 May 2022. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
  103. ^ a b "Леонід Макарович Кравчук". president.gov.ua. Archived from the original on 25 December 2010. Retrieved 8 July 2022.

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
  • Media related to Leonid Kravchuk at Wikimedia Commons
  • Quotations related to Leonid Kravchuk at Wikiquote
  • Appearances on C-SPAN
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Leonid_Kravchuk&oldid=1325079720"